Michael Ejercito
2011-06-27 03:58:43 UTC
Responding to: Michael Ejercito
What a marriage is, beyond the legal definitions, which is whats on the
cards here along with the discrimination\equality-before-the-law issues,
is up to the married to define for themselves, free from the interference
of the impositions of others and their dogmas. Period.
Kindly indulge in your pro-religious (bordering on anti-American)
nonsense in the privacy of your own home, and only with consenting adults
from here on. Ta.
(FU set appropriately)
--
*=(http://www.churchofreality.org/
So people can marry ANYONE, or ANYTHING?The New "Marriage", Not the Same as Marriage
Just because the same word is used to describe same-sex unions as
opposite-sex unions, does not mean there should or must be no legal or
social distinction between the two
On June 24, 2011, Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York signed the bill
abandoning the definition of marriage in use since New York's days as a
British colony, expanding the definition to include same-sex couples.
This marks the first time same-sex couples have any sort of legal
recognition, status, or approval originating from the state of New York.
I will leave, for another time, the issue of whether this new definition
is consistent with the social understanding of marriage in New York. But
even assuming arguendo that a new social understanding of marriage
warranted redefinition, must or should same- sex unions be treated
IDENTICALLY with opposite-sex unions?
The answer to both of these questions is no.
New York, of course, must abide with the limits of the United States
Constitution and the New York Constitution is crafting its policies in
marriage and family. Under under binding precedent from both the United
States Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals, identical
treatment is not required.
In Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 34 L.E.2d 65, 93 S. Ct. 37 (1972), the
Supreme Court summarily dismissed an appeal alleging that Minnesota's
refusal to grant a marriage license to a couple on the basis of the sex
of the partners violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that there was at least a rational basis
for doing so. While there are some twists and turns regarding summary
dismissals, they are decisions on the merits and constitute precedent.
If, under Baker, same-sex unions can be completely denied any sort of
legal status, a legally recognized same- sex union, regardless of what
it is called, may be treated differently under the law from opposite-sex
unions, just as long as there is a rational basis for the difference.
And in Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. Ct. of
Appeals 2006), the Court of Appeals likewise rejected similar challenges
based on the state's constitution, holding that the historical and
traditional definition of marriage satisfied rational basis review. Just
like Baker does at the federal level, Hernandez stands for, at the state
level, the proposition that a legally recognized same-sex union,
regardless of what it is called, may be treated differently under the
law from opposite-sex unions, just as long as there is a rational basis
for the difference.
And unlike superficial characteristics such as skin color, sex is a
substantial characteristic that differentiates same-sex unions from
opposite-sex unions. To begin with, an opposite-sex union, on average,
is many, many times more likely to experience an unplanned pregnancy
than a same-sex union. This is a huge difference, as wives of husbands
in marriages often have to restrict their participation in the
workforce, if only to take care of small children due to unplanned
pregnancies. In addition, unplanned pregnancies result in medical
expenses associated with prenatal care, childbirth, and pediatric care.
Furthermore, a husband of a wife is in a greater natural position to
remarry a "trophy wife" after a divorce than the wife. These issues are
much less present with same-sex unions than opposite- sex unions, and
laws regarding marriage and family should account for these differences.
One example of a law that would account for these differences is a law
granting preferential treatment to partners in legally recognized
opposite-sex unions concerning adoption. Children, on average, are
raised best by a mother and father. To be sure, there are and were
alternate forms of families, including groups of monks and nuns raising
children communally in monasteries. But while medieval European society
found it admirable and honorable for a group of monks or nuns (of the
same sex and presumably in non-sexual relationships) to communally raise
orphans, they were not regarded as married, or legally or socially
identical to married couples doing the same.
It will be ill-advised, to both the individuals involved and to society
as a whole, if a couple in a homosexual relationship, or a pair of monks
raising children, were treated like married couples without regard for
these inherent differences.
What a huge steaming pile of sour-grapes multi-xposted flame-war crap.Just because the same word is used to describe same-sex unions as
opposite-sex unions, does not mean there should or must be no legal or
social distinction between the two
On June 24, 2011, Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York signed the bill
abandoning the definition of marriage in use since New York's days as a
British colony, expanding the definition to include same-sex couples.
This marks the first time same-sex couples have any sort of legal
recognition, status, or approval originating from the state of New York.
I will leave, for another time, the issue of whether this new definition
is consistent with the social understanding of marriage in New York. But
even assuming arguendo that a new social understanding of marriage
warranted redefinition, must or should same- sex unions be treated
IDENTICALLY with opposite-sex unions?
The answer to both of these questions is no.
New York, of course, must abide with the limits of the United States
Constitution and the New York Constitution is crafting its policies in
marriage and family. Under under binding precedent from both the United
States Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals, identical
treatment is not required.
In Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 34 L.E.2d 65, 93 S. Ct. 37 (1972), the
Supreme Court summarily dismissed an appeal alleging that Minnesota's
refusal to grant a marriage license to a couple on the basis of the sex
of the partners violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that there was at least a rational basis
for doing so. While there are some twists and turns regarding summary
dismissals, they are decisions on the merits and constitute precedent.
If, under Baker, same-sex unions can be completely denied any sort of
legal status, a legally recognized same- sex union, regardless of what
it is called, may be treated differently under the law from opposite-sex
unions, just as long as there is a rational basis for the difference.
And in Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. Ct. of
Appeals 2006), the Court of Appeals likewise rejected similar challenges
based on the state's constitution, holding that the historical and
traditional definition of marriage satisfied rational basis review. Just
like Baker does at the federal level, Hernandez stands for, at the state
level, the proposition that a legally recognized same-sex union,
regardless of what it is called, may be treated differently under the
law from opposite-sex unions, just as long as there is a rational basis
for the difference.
And unlike superficial characteristics such as skin color, sex is a
substantial characteristic that differentiates same-sex unions from
opposite-sex unions. To begin with, an opposite-sex union, on average,
is many, many times more likely to experience an unplanned pregnancy
than a same-sex union. This is a huge difference, as wives of husbands
in marriages often have to restrict their participation in the
workforce, if only to take care of small children due to unplanned
pregnancies. In addition, unplanned pregnancies result in medical
expenses associated with prenatal care, childbirth, and pediatric care.
Furthermore, a husband of a wife is in a greater natural position to
remarry a "trophy wife" after a divorce than the wife. These issues are
much less present with same-sex unions than opposite- sex unions, and
laws regarding marriage and family should account for these differences.
One example of a law that would account for these differences is a law
granting preferential treatment to partners in legally recognized
opposite-sex unions concerning adoption. Children, on average, are
raised best by a mother and father. To be sure, there are and were
alternate forms of families, including groups of monks and nuns raising
children communally in monasteries. But while medieval European society
found it admirable and honorable for a group of monks or nuns (of the
same sex and presumably in non-sexual relationships) to communally raise
orphans, they were not regarded as married, or legally or socially
identical to married couples doing the same.
It will be ill-advised, to both the individuals involved and to society
as a whole, if a couple in a homosexual relationship, or a pair of monks
raising children, were treated like married couples without regard for
these inherent differences.
What a marriage is, beyond the legal definitions, which is whats on the
cards here along with the discrimination\equality-before-the-law issues,
is up to the married to define for themselves, free from the interference
of the impositions of others and their dogmas. Period.
Kindly indulge in your pro-religious (bordering on anti-American)
nonsense in the privacy of your own home, and only with consenting adults
from here on. Ta.
(FU set appropriately)
--
*=(http://www.churchofreality.org/
Such an idea is nowhere to be found in our SECULAR moral, legal, or
philosophical traditions.
Michael